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From Polygamy to Peyote:  What is the Proper 
Role of Religion in American Political Decision-
Making? 
Religion in Politics: Constitutional and Moral Perspectives 
by Michael J. Perry  
Oxford University Press (1997) 
 “Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is 
an abomination.”1 
 
 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, in light of the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution, 
is it ever constitutionally proper for either a citizen or a legisla-
tor to make political arguments or decisions about homosexual-
ity based exclusively upon the Bible’s teachings? Beyond the 
constitutional context, is it ever morally proper to use the Bible 
as a basis for a political decision about homosexuality? In Re-
ligion in Politics, Professor Michael J. Perry attempts to an-
swer these questions by addressing two general issues: (1) 
Given the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the 
Constitution, what constitutionally permissible role, if any, 
may religious arguments play, “in the United States, either in 
public debate about what political choices to make or as a basis 
of political choice,”3 and (2) What morally permissible role, if 
any, may religious arguments play in the United States, “either 
 
 1. Leviticus 18:22 (King James). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3. MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL 
PERSPECTIVES 31 (1997). 
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in public debate about what political choices to make or as a 
basis of political choice?”4 
Perry concludes that while it is constitutionally permissible 
to present religious arguments in public debate, it is not consti-
tutionally permissible to make a political choice based upon a 
religious argument in the absence of a plausible secular argu-
ment that supports the same conclusion.5 Perry also addresses 
what he terms the “morally” proper role for religion to play in 
the United States. By morally proper role, Perry “mean[s] sim-
ply the role that, taking into account every relevant considera-
tion (other than constitutionality), we should deem it permissi-
ble or proper for religious arguments to play in politics.”6 Perry 
argues that it is not only morally permissible, but important, 
that religious arguments be presented in public political de-
bate, principally so that the religious arguments may be 
tested.7 Further, Perry believes that it is morally permissible to 
rely on a religious argument that all human beings are sacred, 
even if no persuasive secular argument supports that claim.8 In 
contrast, Perry concludes that in making a choice about the re-
quirements of human well-being, it is morally impermissible to 
rely upon religious arguments unless a persuasive secular ar-
gument would reach the same conclusion.9 
This Book Review discusses Religion in Politics and, par-
ticularly, Perry’s treatment of the above stated issues. Part II 
discusses Perry’s conclusion about the constitutionally permis-
sible role of religious arguments in public debate or as a basis 
of political choice. Part III discusses Perry’s conclusion about 
the morally proper role of religious arguments in the same fora. 
Part IV addresses the difficulty of applying Perry’s theory in 
practice. Part V concludes that although Perry attempts to pre-
sent a middle road between separationists and accommodation-
ists, his book is nothing more than sugarcoated separationism. 
 
 
II. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROPER ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE 
 
 4. Id. at 3. 
 5. See id. at 6, 33. 
 6. Id. at 43. 
 7. See id. at 6, 44-45. 
 8. See id. at 6, 66-70. 
 9. See id. at 6, 76. 
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UNITED STATES 
Perry concludes that it is constitutionally permissible to 
present religious arguments in public debate, but impermissi-
ble to make a political choice based upon a religious argument 
in the absence of a plausible secular argument in support of the 
same result.10 In explaining this conclusion, Perry states that 
“free exercise forbids . . . tak[ing] prohibitory action disfavoring 
one or more religious practices as such,” and “nonestablish-
ment forbids . . . favor[ing] one or more religions as such.”11 
Therefore, “to make a coercive political choice . . . that can be 
supported only by a religious reason or reasons is . . . to impose 
religion.”12 Nonetheless, Professor Perry concludes that “the 
[First Amendment] is good news not just for the atheists and 
agnostics among us; it is good news for us all.”13 This is because 
the First Amendment limits the imposition of religious belief, 
while at the same time protecting that belief.14 
It is not at all clear, however, that the current state of First 
Amendment jurisprudence accords with Perry’s assertion that 
the First Amendment truly “is good news for us all.” Perry’s 
theory that the First Amendment treats the religious and non-
religious equally assumes a “balanced” interpretation of the 
First Amendment: it is acceptable for the Establishment 
Clause to limit the religious believer’s reliance upon religious 
arguments in support of political choices only if the exercise of 
the religious believer’s beliefs is protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause. Ten years ago, one constitutional scholar expressed 
concern that the First Amendment was becoming unbalanced: 
“[T]he establishment clause seems to be on the verge of swal-
lowing the free exercise clause; it is as though the neutrality 
commanded by the establishment clause constitutes a hostility 
toward the freedom protected by the free exercise clause,” thus 
leading to the danger that “the establishment clause might be 
on the verge of becoming not anti-establishment, but simply 
 
 10. See id. at 6, 33. 
 11. Id. at 15. 
 12. Id. at 36. 
 13. Id. at 18. 
 14. See id. (“An important way to protect the freedom of those of us who count 
ourselves religious to follow our religious consciences where they lead—especially the 
freedom of those of us who are not politically powerful—is for the constitutional law of 
the United States to forbid the politically powerful among us to act, in large ways or 
small, in obvious ways or subtle, to privilege (‘establish’) their brand of religion.”). 
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anti-religion.”15 As will be discussed, recent Supreme Court de-
cisions have transformed that concern into reality.16 Because 
there is no longer a “balanced” First Amendment, Perry’s the-
ory that it is impermissible to rely upon religious arguments to 
make political choices in the absence of an equally persuasive 
secular rationale is strong medicine to the religious believer, 
who becomes subjected to the full limitations of, but receives no 
corresponding benefits from, the First Amendment. 
In 1990 the Supreme Court, in Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,17 upheld 
against a free exercise challenge a generally applicable state 
law, which criminalized the use of peyote.18 The law at issue 
was used to deny unemployment benefits to members of the 
Native American Church who lost their jobs because of their 
use of peyote during church services.19 In Smith, the Court de-
clined to apply the balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner,20 which 
asks whether the law at issue substantially burdens a religious 
practice and, if so, whether there is a compelling government 
interest to justify the burden.21 
The Smith Court wrote that “if prohibiting the exercise of 
religion . . . is . . . merely the incidental effect of a generally ap-
plicable and otherwise valid provision,” the Free Exercise 
Clause, without regard to whether the provision serves a com-
pelling governmental interest, has not been violated.22 Further, 
the Court held that any hardship suffered by religious believers 
under generally applicable laws is simply an “unavoidable con-
sequence of democratic government.”23 
In so holding, the Court resurrected the Reynolds v. United 
States24 belief-action doctrine that “[l]aws are made for the gov-
ernment of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere 
 
 15. Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
932, 937-38 (1989). 
 16. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Employment Div., Dep’t of 
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 17. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 18. See id. 
 19.  See id. at 874. 
 20. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 21. See id. 
 22. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 23. Id. at 890. 
 24. 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
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religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.”25 This 
doctrine conveys the message that “you are free to believe as 
you like, but, for goodness sake, don’t act on it!”26 Further, the 
belief-action doctrine has been criticized for “not [being] a line 
that can provide real assistance” because if it were consistently 
applied, the result would be consistent infringement of unques-
tioned First Amendment rights.27 The Smith Court concluded 
that “government may not compel affirmation of religious belief 
[or] punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be 
false”;28 it will protect one and only one religious act: the act of 
speaking.29 
Perhaps recognizing the imbalance in the First Amendment 
caused by Smith and its effects upon his interpretation of the 
First Amendment, Perry feels that we should return to the “ac-
commodationist” interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.30 
This interpretation holds that the “ ‘free-exercise of religion’ is 
such an important value that government must not only not 
discriminate against religious practice but must do what it can, 
short of compromising an important public interest, to avoid 
putting substantial impediments in the way of religious prac-
tice.”31 This “accommodation” would be accomplished by “ex-
empting” religious believers from generally applicable laws, 
when the government’s regulation interest is not very impor-
tant. 
The “accommodationist” view was essentially codified by 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), legisla-
tion that was enacted in response to Smith. RFRA prohibits 
“[g]overnment” from “substantially burdening” an individual’s 
 
 25. Id. at 166. 
 26. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 130 (1993). 
 27. PHILLIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 101-02 (1961); see also FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC 
OF CHURCH AND STATE 40 n.37 (1995). 
 28. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877. 
 29.  To justify the result in Smith, the Court grasped upon a previously popular 
idea: If the government were to allow exemptions from generally applicable laws for 
those who claimed a religious belief, then false claims would overwhelm the courts, and 
anarchy would follow. Interestingly enough, during the period from 1963 to 1990, when 
the Supreme Court generally followed the Sherbert balancing test, there was no re-
markable problem with false claims for exemptions based upon religious belief. See 
GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 30, 40-41. 
 30. PERRY, supra note 3, at 30. 
 31. Id. at 28. 
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exercise of religion unless the burden “(1) is in furtherance of a 
compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive 
means of furthering that . . . interest.”32 RFRA applied to any 
branch of Federal or State Government, to all officials, and to 
other persons acting under color of law,33 and its coverage ex-
tended to “all Federal and State law, and the implementation 
of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether 
adopted before or after [RFRA’s enactment].”34 
Religion in Politics was published before City of Boerne v. 
Flores, the 1997 decision wherein the Supreme Court found 
that RFRA unconstitutionally exceeded Congress’s power.35 
Flores leaves the future of RFRA uncertain, and casts a shadow 
over the validity of the accommodationist interpretation of the 
First Amendment. After Flores, it appears that the holding of 
Smith constitutes the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment’s religion clauses, thus leading to the conclu-
sion that the First Amendment is currently “unbalanced.” This 
demonstrates the weakness of Perry’s argument that religion 
should not form the sole basis for political decision making. If 
religious believers must rely only upon persuasive secular ra-
tionales when making political decisions, then tens of millions 
of Americans will be prohibited from demanding government 
action in accordance with their consciences. At the same time, 
any hardship suffered by these religious people under generally 
applicable laws will simply be an “unavoidable consequence of 
democratic government,”36 regardless of whether the law is 
supported by a compelling government interest.  
Contrary to both the Supreme Court’s holding in Zorach v. 
Clauson37 and Perry’s assumption, the First Amendment now 
favors those who do not believe in religion over those who do.38 
As Stephen L. Carter has written: 
 
 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1993). 
 33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1993). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (1993). 
 35. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 36. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1990); see also GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 38; Carter, supra note 15, at 938. 
 37.  343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
 38. See id. at 314 (holding that the constitution does not have a requirement of 
“callous indifference” to religious groups, and that the Court ought not to prefer those 
who do not believe in religion over those who do). 
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In a nation that prides itself on cherishing religious 
freedom, it is something of a puzzle that a Communist 
or a Republican may try to have his world view reflected 
in the nation’s law, but a religionist cannot; that one 
whose basic tool for understanding the world is empiri-
cism may seek to have her discoveries taught in the 
schools, but one whose basic tool is scripture cannot; 
that one whose conscience moves him to doubt the valid-
ity of the social science curriculum may move to have it 
changed, but one whose religious conviction moves her 
to doubt the validity of the natural science curriculum 
may not.39 
III.  MORALLY PROPER ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
In addition to making a constitutional inquiry, Perry ad-
dresses the “morally” proper role for religion to play in the 
United States. Perry argues that it is not only morally permis-
sible, but important that religious arguments be presented in 
public political debate, principally so that those arguments 
may be tested.40 Further, Perry argues that, as a matter of po-
litical morality, it is permissible to “rely on a religious argu-
ment that every human being is sacred whether or not any in-
telligible or persuasive or even plausible secular argument 
supports the claim about the sacredness of every human be-
ing.”41 Why? Because “the proposition that every human being 
is sacred is a fundamental constituent of American moral cul-
ture” and it would therefore be “silly” to insist otherwise.42 Be-
cause this value is fundamental in nature, it is not subject to 
the “demonstrated, ubiquitous human propensity to be mis-
taken and even deceive oneself about what God has revealed.”43 
In contrast, Perry concludes that in making a choice about 
the requirements of human well-being, it is morally impermis-
sible to rely upon religious arguments unless a persuasive 
secular argument would reach the same conclusion.44 Perry 
 
 39. Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism and Treating Religion as a 
Hobby, 1987 DUKE L.J. 977, 985-86. 
 40. See PERRY, supra note 3, at 6, 44-45. 
 41. Id. at 69.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 75. 
 44. See id. at 6, 76. 
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supports this limitation with the following line of reasoning: 
“The paradigmatic religious argument about the requirements 
of human well-being relies . . . on a claim about what God has 
revealed”;45 therefore, “[g]iven the demonstrated, ubiquitous 
human propensity to be mistaken and even to deceive oneself 
about what God has revealed,”46 the absence of a persuasive 
secular argument in support of a claim about the requirements 
of human well-being fairly supports a presumption that the 
claim is probably false, and that it is probably the defective 
yield of that demonstrated propensity. If nothing else, it sup-
ports a presumption that the claim is an inappropriate ground 
of political choice, especially coercive political choice.47 
Perry’s theory is flawed for several reasons. First, rather 
than being narrowly defined, the concept of “American moral 
culture” is fluid and open to manipulation, depending upon 
what argument the concept is used to support. For instance, 
many would consider ideas about the traditional nuclear family 
as “fundamental constituent[s] of American moral culture,”48 
while others would consider those ideas “old-fashioned.” Fol-
lowing Perry’s reasoning, if one were endeavoring to support an 
argument against homosexual marriage, for instance, she 
would assert that the traditional nuclear family is fundamen-
tally a part of American moral culture. Conversely, if one were 
endeavoring to support an argument in favor of homosexual 
marriage, she would assert that even if the traditional nuclear 
family were at one time a fundamental part of American moral 
culture, that is no longer the case. 
Second, are we to interpret Perry’s theory as advocating the 
 
 45. Id. at 73. 
 46.  Id. at 75. 
 47. See id. at 75. (“Moreover, as the American philosopher Robert Audi (who 
identifies himself as a Christian) has explained, ‘good secular arguments for moral 
principles may be better reasons to believe those principles divinely enjoined than theo-
logical arguments for the principles, based on scripture or tradition.’ This is because 
the latter—in particular, scripture-based and tradition-based religious arguments—are 
‘more subject than the former to extraneous cultural influences, more vulnerable to 
misinterpretation of texts or their sheer corruption across time and translation, and 
more libel to bias stemming from political or other nonreligious aims.’ (Christianity’s 
acceptance of slavery comes to mind here—an acceptance that persisted for most of the 
two millennia of Christianity.) Audi’s conclusion: ‘[I]t may be better to try to under-
stand God through ethics than through theology.’ ”) (quoting Robert Audi, The Place of 
Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 699 
(1993)). 
 48. GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 17. 
JEN-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:16 PM 
921] BOOK REVIEW: RELIGION IN POLITICS 929 
view that if a political choice is based upon what one believes to 
be a “fundamental constituent of American moral culture,” 
then a persuasive secular argument in support of that political 
choice is unnecessary? Take, for instance, those individuals 
who cling for religious reasons, in the absence of persuasive 
secular support, to elements of what they believe to be the 
“American moral culture,” like monogamous, heterosexual 
marriage. Are they not in the same posture as Perry with re-
spect to his premise that all human beings are sacred? 
Third, there is historical evidence that the “American moral 
culture” has its roots in religion, or in what man believes God 
has revealed. Perry’s premise that all human beings are sacred 
grew in America from the religious belief that all humans are 
sons and daughters of God, and as such, are brothers and sis-
ters.49 As Frederick Mark Gedicks has observed, “nineteenth 
century Americans generally believed that [religious] values 
formed an important part of the moral foundation on which a 
free and democratic society is built.”50 Further, “the Supreme 
Court [has] quote[d] Chancellor Kent to the effect that ‘we are 
a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply in-
grafted upon Christianity’ . . . .”51 As Justice Douglas explained 
in Zorach v. Clauson, “We are a religious people whose institu-
tions presuppose a Supreme Being.”52 If American moral cul-
ture has its basis in religion, then according to Perry’s reason-
ing, American moral culture is “the defective yield” of man’s 
“demonstrated, ubiquitous . . . propensity to be mistaken and 
even to deceive oneself about what God has revealed.”53 In light 
of these problems with Perry’s theory, his exception should be 
generalized with each individual, legislator, or government of-
ficial allowed to rely upon the argument that seems best to 
them, regardless of the existence or absence of an equally per-
suasive secular argument. 
 
 49. See PERRY, supra note 3, at 67. 
 50. GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 15 (citing 1 ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA 306 (Phillips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1990) (“[Americans] combine the 
notions of Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their minds that it is impossible 
to make them conceive the one without the other.”). 
 51. GEDICKS, supra note 27, at 16.  
 52. 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (emphasis added). 
 53.  PERRY, supra note 3, at 75. 
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IV.  SELF-ENFORCEMENT 
Even if Perry’s theory is sound, its application would be 
practically impossible. Perry states that his ideal that people 
refrain from relying on religious arguments in support of politi-
cal choices, in the absence of an equally persuasive secular ar-
gument, “would have to be self-enforced.”54 But he concedes 
that “it is inevitable that some legislators, and some citizens 
participating in a referendum or an initiative election, will rely 
on—will put at least some weight on—religious arguments in 
voting for political choices.”55 Throughout his book, therefore, 
Perry couches his theory in terms of it being an “ideal matter,” 
or as one under which citizens, legislators, and public officials 
should be “exceedingly wary” of relying on religious arguments 
in the absence of a persuasive secular argument.56 By using 
these terms, Perry acknowledges that his theory will be diffi-
cult to apply. A statement by Mark Tushnet further demon-
strates this difficulty: “As far as I can tell, I am a Jew down to 
the ground, and I cannot imagine a political decision that I 
could make without reference, at some level of my being, to my 
Jewishness.”57 It is likely that in the United States, where reli-
gious faith is more widespread than in any other nation in the 
Western world,58 many individuals, legislators, and political 
leaders are, like Tushnet, Jews, Catholics, Baptists, Presbyte-
rians, Methodists, Mormons, Muslims, Buddhists, or believers 
of an almost countless number of religious denominations, 
“down to the ground.” When a Roman Catholic who believes 
and follows Vatican decrees concerning the Church’s opposition 
to the legitimization of gay marriage, abortion, and the death 
 
 54. PERRY, supra note 3, at 37. 
 55. Id. at 44. 
 56. Id. at 33, 66, 76, 83. 
 57. Mark Tushnet, Religion in Politics, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (1989) (re-
viewing KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988)) 
(“People at all points on the political spectrum do in fact rely on their religious convic-
tions in deciding to support or oppose expansion of public responsibility for the needy, 
increases in public responsibility for inculcation of moral values in the young, and a 
range of policies on abortion.”). 
 58. See Carter, supra note 15, at 939. According to recent studies, 95% of Ameri-
cans profess a belief in God and 70% of American adults are members of a church or 
synagogue. See PERRY, supra note 3, at 1; Book Note, 108 HARV. L. REV. 495, 498 n.21 
(1994) (reviewing ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE: IS 
ABORTION DEBATABLE? (1993)). 
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penalty59 is asked to make political choices about these issues, 
is it reasonable to think that she would disregard her religious 
belief in making those choices? Steven L. Carter has addressed 
this issue, arguing that religious faith is not something that 
can be “shrugged off”; it is unreasonable to forbid those who are 
religious “down to the ground” from relying upon religious ar-
guments for political choices just because they have no persua-
sive secular reason to support that argument: 
[This requirement] asks the devout citizen to become 
another person, to abandon the most important aspect 
of her life. No one would imagine asking her to leave 
behind an arm or a leg in order to join her fellow citi-
zens in their deliberations over policy; no one would ask 
her even to abandon moral or political conviction. But if 
her source of her conviction is faith, and if the faith is of 
religious dimension, then she must transform herself 
into another person—one who is not religiously devout.60 
V.  CONCLUSION 
At the outset, Professor Perry presents his book as one 
carving a path down the middle of the debate concerning the 
proper place for religion in politics. 
I have written this book as a Christian. In particular, I 
have written it as a Catholic Christian thoroughly im-
bued with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council 
(1962-65). But I have written this book as a Christian 
who is extremely wary of the God-talk in which most 
Christians (and many others) too often and too easily 
engage . . . . Moreover, I have written this book as one 
who stands between all religious nonbelievers on the 
one side and many religious believers—especially theo-
logical conservative believers—on the other.61 
 
 59. See Pope Reiterates Stand Opposing Legitimization of Gay Marriages, 
CHATTANOOGA TIMES & FREE PRESS, Jan. 22, 1999, at A10; Diego Ribadeneira, Pope 
Exhorts America to ‘Defend Life’; John Paul Urges U.S. to Reject Abortion, the Death 
Penalty, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1999, at A3; Larry B. Stammer, Cardinal Reiterates 
Opposition to Abortion, Homosexual Acts, CONTRA-COSTA TIMES, Feb. 13, 1999, at A15. 
 60. Carter, supra note 15, at 940. (“Religious faith is not something that can be 
shrugged off like an unattractive article of clothing. The very idea of devotion suggests 
a way of ordering all life and all knowledge, including, although not exclusively, moral 
knowledge.”). 
 61. PERRY, supra note 3, at 7. 
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Further, Perry’s conclusion that it is acceptable to rely upon 
religious arguments in making political choices, when an 
equally persuasive secular argument exists in support of the 
political choice, seems to balance the ideas of both religious 
separationists and accommodationists.62 Perry also attempts to 
demonstrate the neutrality of his rationale by explaining that 
the limitation on the use of religious arguments to make politi-
cal choices has little “practical significance . . . because there 
will be plausible secular rationales for most such political 
choices.”63 But in reality, his theory is little more than sugar-
coated separatism. According to Perry’s theory, in the absence 
of a persuasive nonreligious rationale, it is never permissible to 
rely upon religious arguments when making a political choice.64 
Based upon the current debates surrounding abortion, homo-
sexual marriage, euthanasia, and public responsibility for the 
needy, it is far from certain that plausible secular rationales 
exist for political choices concerning these issues. 




 62. See Audi, supra note 47 (separationist); Carter, supra note 15 (accomodation-
ist); Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor’s Per-
spective, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 13 (1984) (separationist); Douglas 
Laycock, Freedom of Speech That is Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
793 (1996) (accomodationist); William Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise 
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) (separationist). 
 63. PERRY, supra note 3, at 36. 
 64. See Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decision 
Making, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 513, 517-18 (1998). 
